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Grasping Michael Walzer’s standing as a just war thinker presents real difficulties. He is, on 
most people’s reckoning, the single most influential just war thinker of the last hundred 
years; theologians might look to Paul Ramsey, historians of the tradition to James Turner 
Johnson, but, for political theorists and philosophers, scholars of international relations, 
military educators and the general reader, Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars is the single most 
important modern work in the field (Johnson, 1975 & 1981: Ramsey, 1968: Walzer, 
1977/2015, Nardin et al, 1997). First published in the immediate aftermath of the Vietnam 
War in 1977, it has never been out of print, nor has it required revision – the five editions of 
the book have different prefaces or afterwords addressing the issues of the day, but the text 
itself remains unchanged, still relevant, a genuine classic in the full sense of the term. So, 
where is the problem? It lies in the fact that, set in the context of the tradition, he is not, in 
any considered sense of the term, a just war thinker at all. From a historical point of view, the 
just war tradition is Christian, specifically Catholic, while Walzer is a secular Jew, a political 
philosopher whose democratic socialist beliefs have few points of contact with Augustine, 
Aquinas and their successors and, as a result, whose account of the just war ignores, or 
sometimes actually rejects, many features of the tradition. His approach to the tradition is à la 
carte – he takes from it what he needs, what makes sense to him, and leaves the rest. Whence 
the aforementioned difficulty.  In the twenty-first century, just war thinkers can generally be 
divided into ‘traditionalists’ whose work follows on from Aquinas, Augustine et al, or 
‘revisionists’, whose arguments conform to the norms of analytical philosophy; Walzer falls 
	 2	
into neither camp – he is sui generis, a law unto himself, and yet more influential than all the 
other just war thinkers put together.  To explore this paradox, we need to place Just and 
Unjust War in the context of its times, and Walzer’s life.   
 
Texts and Contexts 
 
Born in 1935 in New York City, Walzer was educated at Brandeis University, Cambridge, 
UK, and Harvard, where he was awarded his PhD in 1961 for a thesis, subsequently 
published as The Revolution of the Saints: A Study in the Origins of Revolutionary Politics 
(1965). This was an examination of the thought of seventeenth century Puritanism in 
England; it highlighted an interest in the theme of religion and politics which persists to the 
present day, as witnessed by his work on the Jewish Political Traditions (2000, 2003), and by 
his most recent book, The Paradox of Liberation: Secular Revolutions and Religious 
Counterrevolutions (2015).   But as well as writing and thinking as a political philosopher, 
Walzer was in the 1950s and 60s, and is now, a political activist, a participant in the politics 
of the democratic left in the United States, a contributor to, and, for thirty years until recently, 
a co-editor of the democratic socialist journal Dissent. To participate in American politics in 
the 1960s necessarily involved adopting a position on the Vietnam War; Walzer, by then a 
teacher at first Princeton and then Harvard was, predictably, an active member of the anti-war 
movement, and his academic focus shifted as a result of this engagement. The first product of 
this shift was his collection of essays, Obligations: Essays on Disobedience, War and 
Citizenship (1970), but by far the most substantial work this new engagement stimulated was 
the aforementioned Just and Unjust Wars which appeared in 1977 after the end of the war, 
and drew from that conflict only a few of the many practical examples of moral dilemmas in 
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war which make it such an attractive read, but which is clearly still steeped in the politics of 
the era. 
 
Part 1 of Just and Unjust Wars focuses on the moral reality of war, arguing against realism.  
Walzer’s opposition to the Vietnam War quite naturally ruled out the adoption of a political 
realist, Clausewitzian understanding of war as simply an act of policy, with no particular 
moral freight attached to the choice of violence.  For Walzer, the default setting is that to 
wage war is to commit a crime. However, unlike many members of the anti-war movement, 
he did not adopt a pacifist stance, opposing all wars, nor did he espouse the ultra-radical 
position of supporting only wars of national liberation.  The dedication of the book, drawn 
from the Pillar of Heroism at Yad Vashem Memorial in Jerusalem signals his belief in the 
legitimacy of the Allied cause in World War II; equally, he supported Israel’s action in the 
Seven Days War of 1967, which he understood as a war of self-defence, albeit one begun by 
an, in his view justified, pre-emptive strike. These commitments ruled out both the pacifist 
and the ultra-radical position and suggest that there are circumstances under which the 
waging of war is not criminal. His goal is to find a philosophically defensible way of way of 
distinguishing those circumstances where inter-state violence might be legitimate and those 
where it would not be; within the Western canon of political philosophy it is the just war 
tradition that attempts to make this distinction, and this is where he found part – though only 
part – of the inspiration for Just and Unjust Wars.   
 
It is fair to say that prior to Walzer’s book, the Just War tradition had been understood largely 
in Christian, more specifically Roman Catholic, terms, with the most important authorities 
being St Augustine and the Medieval Schoolman St Thomas Aquinas, thinkers whose work is 
examined in depth elsewhere in this volume. Aquinas, in particular, systematised the 
	 4	
doctrine, arguing that God intended us to live together in peace with justice and without 
violence, but that violence might sometimes be necessary to right a wrong and thereby restore 
the peace which had been broken by injustice (Finnis, 1996). For a war to be just (in fact, just 
is not really the right term here, ‘justified’ fits the situation better) a number of criteria need 
to be met – there should be a just cause, a wrong that must be righted, those who wage war 
should do so with right intention, war should only be declared by a proper public authority, as 
a last resort, the violence employed should be proportional to the offence, the innocent should 
be protected, and there should be a reasonable prospect that violence would make things 
better rather than worse. These last four criteria (last resort, proportionality, protection of the 
innocent, prospect of victory) it should be noted, were derived by Aquinas from the ‘golden 
rule’ (‘do unto others as you would be done by’) that governs moral conduct in general, 
rather than from any features of moral reasoning specific to war – strictly speaking, it is the 
first three criteria (just cause, right intention and right authority) that address what is 
distinctive about war.  
 
In the deep tradition of medieval moral philosophy, these criteria were to be understood as a 
package that could not be disaggregated; all must be satisfied for a war to be considered 
‘just’, although this was not a ‘box-ticking’ exercise, but rather one that called for the 
exercise of different kinds of judgement – not for nothing was Aquinas an Aristotelian as 
well as a Christian, and Aristotle’s phronesis, practical judgement, was central to his 
thinking.  However, within the later tradition, and with the rise of the modern state, the 
canonical criteria were gradually separated into two categories, recently characterised as ius 
ad bellam and ius in bello, which dealt respectively with the justice of resort to war, and with 
right conduct in war. This latter distinction provided the framework for Walzer’s book – on 
his account ius ad bellam becomes the theory of aggression derived from the ‘legalist 
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paradigm’ described in Part 2, and ius in bello becomes the ‘war convention’ set out in Part 3. 
To complete the story, Part 4 explores ‘Dilemmas of War’ focusing inter alia on ‘supreme 
emergency’ (on which see below) and nuclear deterrence, while Part 5 straddles both ius ad 
bellam and ius in bello considerations by exploring the question of responsibility, as applied 
to both political leaders, commanders and ordinary soldiers.  
 
Tents and Controversies 
 
Ius ad bellam is presented in terms of a theory of aggression. The ‘legalist paradigm’ governs 
here – it is based on the proposition that there exists a society of states whose members 
possess political sovereignty and territorial integrity; attacks on the latter are acts of 
aggression which the victim is entitled to resist, to enlist the aid of others in so doing, and 
later to punish the aggressor.  With one or two very limited exceptions, the only ‘just cause’ 
that can be recognized under modern conditions is self-defence, and all members of the 
society of states may defend themselves from external assault on their autonomy and 
territory.  The aforementioned exceptions concern pre-emptive war (to be distinguished 
carefully from preventive war) and a very restrictive doctrine of humanitarian intervention 
that would give outsiders the right (though not the duty) to intervene in cases of extreme 
human rights violations – genocide and mass enslavement are mentioned in this context.  
 
The ‘war convention’ concerns the rights of combatants and non-combatants, ius in bello. On 
his account the justice of a war does not affect who may, or may not, be killed or how they 
may be killed. Soldiers should not be understood as simply individuals – they are 
representatives of a political community, but, nonetheless, they do have rights which govern 
the circumstances under which they may kill, or be killed, and the ways in which they kill or 
	 6	
are killed. The ‘moral equality of combatants’ implies that all combatants are legitimate 
targets whether fighting in a just cause or not and subject to the same limitations on the 
weapons that may be employed.  Non-combatants should not be targets in any circumstances 
– though, controversially, he does allow in Part 4 that a ‘supreme emergency’ might justify 
waiving this rule if thereby a greater moral disaster can be avoided. Thus, for example, the 
bombing campaign against German cities in World War II might have been justified had this 
been the only way to prevent the disaster of a Nazi victory – although he argues that it was 
not, and the campaign was therefore illegitimate.  
 
The subtitle of Just and Unjust Wars is ‘A moral argument with historical illustrations’ and in 
Parts 3, 4 and 5 Walzer offers a wide range of such historical illustrations, covering such 
matters as non-combatant immunity and military necessity, sieges and blockades, guerrilla 
war, terrorism, reprisals and war crimes. One of the attractive features of the book is the way 
in which Walzer is determined at every stage to anchor his moral arguments in real-world 
situations, whether drawn from the siege of Jerusalem in 72 AD, submarine warfare in World 
War I or the rules of engagement for American forces in Vietnam.  Walzer has expressed 
elsewhere his impatience and dissatisfaction with the kind of political theory that involves the	‘playful extension of hypothetical cases, moving farther and farther away from the world we 
all lived in’ and the way in which he develops the arguments in Just and Unjust Wars 
exemplifies his determination to remain at all times focused on real people and real issues 
(Walzer, 2003).  It is perhaps misleading to describe the many cases he examines as 
‘illustrations’ – the historical examples he employs do not simply illustrate his arguments, 
they actually are the way in which he argues. In any event, the present author can testify that 
the mini-case studies Walzer offers make the book immensely attractive to students at all 
	 7	
levels, and It is not implausible to argue that part of the longevity of the book rests on its 
sheer readability and utility as a teaching text as well as on the depth of its argument.    
 
The positions Walzer adopts on aggression and the rule of war are broadly compatible with, 
the contemporary legal regime governing the use of force in international relations. The UN 
Charter recognises self-defence as the only legitimate use of force (although only until the 
Security Council has taken the measures necessary to ensure international peace and security, 
Article 51).  Walzer’s willingness to allow for intervention in the case of mass enslavement 
and genocide corresponds to various anti-slavery conventions, and the Genocide Convention 
of 1948.  As far as the War Convention is concerned, the Law of Armed Conflict (also known 
as International Humanitarian Law), that is, the Geneva and Hague Treaties and the 
accompanying Protocols, is clear that the same rules of war apply to all combatants, and the 
same protections to all non-combatants.   
 
One area where Walzer departs from the modern legal regime is with respect to ‘supreme 
emergency’, which is not recognised by lawyers as a legitimate basis for suspending the rules 
of war.  Indeed, it is not simply lawyers who find disturbing the notion that supreme 
emergency can provide a ‘get out of jail’ card.  The problem lies in the difficulty of deciding 
which emergencies are supreme and which are, as it were, normal – most would probably 
agree that a potential victory for Nazism would qualify as a supreme emergency, but some 
might argue that any defeat in war could be seen in the same terms, with the result that the 
qualifications that Walzer wishes to attach to the term go by the board. Still, one suspects that 
most actual decision-makers have in the back of their minds the thought that some such 
provision may be necessary in extremis. Walzer’s thinking on this subject is akin to the 
position laid out in his essay on ‘Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands’ (1973, 
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anthologized in Thinking Politically, 2007) where he argues that there are times when, all 
things considered, it can be right to do something that is morally wrong – a position that 
applies to a range of situations, from the supreme emergencies discussed in Just and Unjust 
Wars to the dubious tactics employed in the so-called War on Terror.  In an interview in 
2003, in the context of the post 9/11 debates on torture, Walzer comments on the issue of 
dirty hands: ‘[But] extreme cases make bad law. Yes, I would do whatever was necessary to 
extract information in the ticking bomb case– that is, I would make the same argument after 
9/11 that I made 30 years before. But I don't want to generalize from cases like that; I don't 
want to rewrite the rule against torture to incorporate this exception. Rules are rules, and 
exceptions are exceptions. I want political leaders to accept the rule, to understand its 
reasons, even to internalize it. I also want them to be smart enough to know when to break it. 
And finally, because they believe in the rule, I want them to feel guilty about breaking it – 
which is the only guarantee they can offer us that they won't break it too often.’ (Walzer, 
2003)  As with supreme emergency, his thinking on this subject probably corresponds to the 
intuitions of most political leaders, albeit that they less rarely acknowledge the essential 
proviso that those who dirty their hands in this way must acknowledge that they have done so 
and bear the guilt that attaches to their acts.  
 
Returning to the more general point, Walzer’s position could be seen as a defence of the 
current legal framework governing the use of force – but it departs radically from what had 
previously been understood to be the just war tradition.  In the tradition, a ‘just cause’ is 
understood in general terms as righting a wrong, and is certainly not restricted to self-
defence. The right to defend oneself is an important feature of the aforementioned ‘golden 
rule’, and the tradition is not hostile to the notion, but while self-defence may be a just cause 
it is not generally understood to be the only just cause. Again, ‘right intention’, the notion that 
	 9	
what is important is not just doing the right thing, but doing it for the right reason, is crucial 
in the tradition but plays no part in Walzer’s account – for Walzer, a just war is a response to 
a crime, and the state of mind of the respondent is relevant only in so far as if it is 
inappropriate it may prejudice or distort his or her actions. The medieval concern with the 
state of the soul of the individual, crucial to Aquinas, plays no part in Walzer’s thinking, 
understandably enough, given his relentlessly secular approach to the just war.  The criterion 
of ‘right authority’ poses many interesting questions in the modern age – for example, does 
the UN Security Council alone possess the authority to legitimate force? Or can we simply 
accept the state as the appropriate authority? – but is barely touched upon by Walzer; as with 
right intention, his legalism points him away from the tradition and towards an examination 
of authority in terms of command responsibility. And finally, with respect to the War 
Convention, the moral equality of combatants central to Walzer’s account, is a principle that 
the tradition would not recognise; wrongdoers do not, could not, have the same moral 
standing as those who would reverse a wrong – although admittedly medieval thinkers saw 
the assignment of right and wrong as ultimately a matter for God, unlike modern analytical 
philosophers who are confident that they themselves can do the job (McMahan, 2009). 
Having said all that, it should perhaps also be noted that Walzer’s opposition to the notion of 
nuclear deterrence, as set out in chapter 17 of Just and Unjust Wars is based on reasoning 
that is much closer to the tradition than the defence of deterrence offered by the theologian 
Paul Ramsey (on whom see Chapter ‘x’ of this volume). Walzer argues that deterrence may 
be a necessary strategy – c.f. a ‘supreme emergency’ – but it is morally unacceptable and 
alternatives should be sought; in an illuminating aside he remarks ‘supreme emergency is 
never a stable position’ (p. 282). 
 
Legacies and Enduring Relevance. 
	 10	
 
Put all this together and it is easy to see why Walzer’s legacy as a just war thinker is so 
complex. Although he uses the term ‘just war’ to describe what he is doing, in practice the 
secular, legalistic version of the just war that he presents bears little relation to the way the 
tradition has understood the term. The driving force of his analysis actually lies elsewhere, in 
his account of the rights of the individual and of the political community.	His focus on self-
defence stems from the belief that in defending the right of political communities to resist 
aggression, he is actually defending the rights of the individuals who make up these 
communities – political communities are worth defending because of the shared 
understandings and common life they promote, and, crucially, this may be true even if their 
institutions of government are non-democratic.  Autonomy is to be valued in its own terms, 
and not simply if it leads to democratic self-government.  As Walzer puts in, 
The moral standing of any particular state depends on the reality of the common life it 
protects and the extent to which the sacrifices required by that protection are willingly 
accepted and thought worthwhile.  If no common life exists, or if the state doesn’t 
defend the common life that does exist, its own defence may have no moral 
justification.  (Walzer, 1977/2015; 54).  
This is why his thinking leads to only a very limited doctrine of humanitarian intervention, in 
contrast to the willingness of many just war theorists to embrace much more radical ideas 
(Johnson, 2005). As a social democrat, Walzer naturally hopes that communities will choose 
democracy, but outsiders are obliged to assume that whatever form of government exists 
reflects the wishes of the people concerned; even if pro-democracy movements are 
suppressed, as long as the society has not collapsed into civil war and insurrection it has to be 
presumed that there is a ‘fit’ between government and people.  Short of such a collapse, the 
only real circumstances in which outsiders would be entitled (although not obliged) to 
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intervene would be in the case of genocide or mass enslavement – in such circumstances the 
fit between governed and governors has clearly broken down, but otherwise the presumption 
of international legitimacy must hold, whatever we think of the internal politics of the 
country in question.  This position is very clearly at odds with the wider just war tradition, 
and, of course, with the cosmopolitanism set out by Charles Beitz and David Luban set out in 
the influential collection International Ethics (Beitz et al, 1985). For pragmatic reasons, 
traditionalists and cosmopolitans may come to the same conclusion about the need to 
embrace anti-interventionist politics as Walzer, although they get there from very different 
starting points.  
 
Would Walzer be concerned to be told that his work departed radically from the just war 
tradition? Almost certainly, he would not. In recent years his approach has come under attack 
from the so-called ‘revisionist’ just war theorists – see the chapter in this volume on Jeff 
McMahan – and he has responded with some force, most particularly in the Afterword to the 
2015 edition of Just and Unjust Wars. As against McMahan’s insistence that soldiers fighting 
in an unjust cause lose the rights we might assign to just combatants, Walzer defends the 
division between ius ad bellam and ius in bello, arguing that the justice of a war should not 
determine the rights of combatants; his attitude to the revisionists is that their theories are 
divorced from the actual practice of war, a position nicely caught in a 2012 online interview 
with Nancy Rosenblum where he sets out the basis for his differences with them – he remarks 
that for the revisionists “the subject of just war theory is just war theory [whereas] I think the 
subject matter of just war theory is war” (Rosenblum, 2012).  This is, I think, an answer that 
he would give with equal force to critics who uphold the traditionalist account of just war. In 
fact, as an answer, it is actually more effective when given to traditionalists as opposed to 
revisionists. Pace his focus on war rather than theory, the way in which he sets up the 
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argument does depend quite heavily on a theory of rights, which leaves him vulnerable to 
those, such as the revisionists, who also begin with rights, but offer a different version of the 
theoretical relationship between the individual and the community. Interestingly, this point 
was picked up in one of the first reviews of Just and Unjust Wars, by Richard Wasserstrom 
in the Harvard Law Review (Wasserstrom, 1978). Wasserstrom suggests, rather harshly, that 
Walzer’s presents an ‘uninspiring, constricted theory of individual rights’ (p. 542), and that a 
more fully worked out account of the rights of individuals would undermine his position that, 
extreme oppression aside, states are entitled to defend their political sovereignty even when 
non-democratic. Whether this criticism is justified or not is a matter that individual readers of 
Walzer’s book will form their own opinions on, but it is worth noting that his position does 
oblige him to fight a war on two fronts – on the one hand, with those who are unhappy with 
the idea of basing a conception of the just war on the notion of individual rights, and, on the 
other, with those who are happy to take this step but offer a different conception of rights. 
 
Walzer is a political philosopher who since producing Just and Unjust Wars has written on a 
great many topics, such as, the nature of justice (Walzer, 1983), the nature of moral 
argumentation and social criticism (Walzer, 1987, 1995a), what it means to be an American 
(Walzer, 1992, 2003) and the Jewish political tradition (Walzer et al, 2000, 2003), but while 
he has never abandoned an interest in war, he has equally not felt it necessary to address the 
subject at anything like the length he did in Just and Unjust Wars. It is predominantly as a 
commentator on public affairs – which he sees as wholly consistent with the vocation of 
political philosophy - that he has returned to the issue of war via contributions to Dissent and 
other radical and liberal journals, the most important of which are anthologised in two 
collections, Arguing About War (2004) and Thinking Politically (2007). In the process he has 
modified somewhat the positions he adopted in his earlier writings. In a Dissent essay of 
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1995, ‘The Politics of Rescue’ (anthologized in Arguing about War), written in response to 
the events of the immediate Post-Cold War era, he widens the range of situations in which 
intervention might be justifiable, and anticipates a longer engagement with post-intervention 
politics than was envisaged in his earlier work. His earlier position involved returning control 
to local populations as soon as possible after an intervention, but he now recognizes that such 
a policy may simply lead to a replication of the circumstances that led to intervention in the 
first place.  
 
Still, his essential position remains anti-interventionist, and he maintained this stance even in 
the aftermath of 9/11, although he supported the US intervention in Afghanistan in 2001 as 
an example of self-defence, and joined with Just War theorists Jean Bethke Elshtain and 
James Turner Johnson in signing the Manifesto ‘What We are Fighting For’ (Elshtain, 2003). 
This latter was directed against those elements on the left in the United States who were 
inclined to blame American foreign policy for the attacks on New York and Washington and 
Walzer re-iterated his resistance to this argument in an interview in 2003, identifying himself 
as in opposition to the Bush Administration, but criticising ‘the idiocy of many of my fellow 
oppositionists: knee-jerk anti-Americanism, old left dogmatism, and the rejection of any 
fellowship larger than the sect of the politically correct and the morally pure’. (Walzer, 2003) 
Still, he parted company with Elshtain and Johnson over the Iraq War, and, in general, in his 
opposition to regime change as a motive for intervention.  On similar grounds he opposed the 
NATO-led intervention in Libya in 2011, thus confirming that he still operates a quite 
restrictive understanding of when ‘rescue’ is appropriate – although it should be said that 
many people who were surprised by his opposition at the time, including the present author, 
now feel that subsequent events have vindicated his caution (Walzer, 2011). More recently, 
his refusal to see action against the so-called Islamic State in Syria as justifiable in 
	 14	
accordance with just war criteria is striking, especially since the leading just war revisionist, 
Jeff McMahan has come out in favour of action (Walzer, 2015; McMahan, 2015).  Walzer’s 
argument here is that there is no reasonable prospect of success and therefore military action 
cannot be justified. This position follows on from a series of articles Walzer has written in 
Dissent over the last five years, in which his position on intervention has shifted, from an 
initial stance against ‘a half-assed intervention’ (Walzer, 2012)), via a defence of Obama’s 
‘dithering over Syria (Walzer, 2013a), to an admission that US intervention earlier in the 
conflict could not, in fact, have made things worse and might have made things better 
(Walzer, 2013b).  These short blog posts are actually very revealing about the way in Walzer 
thinks about war and justice; some at least of the classic just war criteria lurk in the 
background of his arguments – last resort, proportionality, a reasonable prospect of success – 
but the foreground is always a kind of principled pragmatism, an engagement with the facts, a 
willingness to change his mind when the circumstances demand it. As against the dogmatism 
of some just warriors of both traditionalist and revisionist disposition, Walzer might well 
deploy the formulation attributed, probably wrongly, to John Maynard Keynes – ‘When the 
facts change, I change my mind. What do you do sir?’ 
 
Walzer’s distaste for an approach to political theory that relies on high levels of abstraction 
and fanciful hypothetical examples has been noted above, and adherents of that kind of 
theory have often responded in kind, as witnessed by some of the essays collected in 
Pluralism, Justice and Equality (Walzer & Miller, 1995).  In another context, a master of 
abstract political theory – Jon Elster – once referred to Walzer as ‘a phenomenologist of the 
moral life’ (Elster, 1992, 14).  This was not, I think, intended as a compliment, but it seems to 
me to encapsulate perfectly Walzer’s project over the last sixty years, and to point us towards 
understanding why Just and Unjust Wars continues to be a source of inspiration for scholars 
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and students. His concern always is with how life is actually lived – in this case, with how 
and why wars are actually fought. He brings out the moral dilemmas of war with a clarity that 
few other contemporary writers have achieved, and encourages us to use our wits to think 
about those dilemmas; he employs some of the concepts made available to him by the just 
war tradition, but is never afraid to discard parts of the tradition, or adapt other parts to make 
them more amenable to contemporary conditions. In a world where new forms of warfare 
abound – asymmetric, hybrid, cyber – this flexibility is obviously called for, but it is crucially 
important that it be accompanied by a moral compass that will tell us if we are straying into 
dangerous ground. It is because he possesses such a compass that Walzer’s work remains 
relevant and his commentaries on current affairs, international and domestic, have such force. 
He may or may not be a ‘just war thinker’ in the full sense of the term, but he certainly is the 




Beitz, C., Cohen, M., Scanlon, T. and Simmons, J. A. (Eds.) (1985) International Ethics, 
Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.  
Elster, J. (1992) Local Justice New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Elshtain, J. B. (2003) Just War Against Terror: The Burden of American Power in a Violent 
World New York: Basic Books. 
Finnis J (1996) The Ethics of War and Peace in the Catholic Natural Law Tradition. In: 
Nardin T (ed.), The Ethics of War and Peace, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Johnson, J. T. (1975) Ideology, Reason and the Limitation of War Princeton NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
Johnson, J.T. (1981) Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War Princeton NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
Johnson, J. T.  (2005) The War to Oust Saddam Hussein: Just War and the New Face of 
Conflict, Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield. 
McMahan, Jeff (2009) Killing in War. Oxford University Press. 
McMahan, Jeff (2015) ‘Syria is a Modern Day Holocaust: We Must Act’ Washington Post In 
Theory: Opinion 30 November, 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-
theory/wp/2015/11/30/syria-is-a-modern-day-holocaust-we-must-act/ 
Nardin, T., Smith, M.J., Hendrickson, D.C., Koontz, T.J., Boyle, J. and Walzer, M. (1997) 
‘Special Section: Twenty Years of Michael Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars’ , Ethics 
and International Affairs,  11.  pp 3 – 104   
Ramsey, P. (1968) The Just War: Force and Political Responsibility, NY: Charles Scribner’s 
Sons. 
	 16	
Rosenblum, Nancy (2012) ‘A Conversation with Michael Walzer’ 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TvpnmmLoO38 Accessed 18 May 2015 
Walzer, M. (1965) The Revolution of the Saints: A Study in the Origins of Revolutionary 
Politics, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.  
Walzer, M. (1970) Obligations: Essays on Disobedience, War and Citizenship. Cambridge 
MA: Harvard University Press. 
Walzer, M. (1973) ‘Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands’ Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 2 (2) pp 160 – 180 
Walzer, M. (1977, 5th ed. 2015) Just and Unjust Wars. New York: Basic Books. 
Walzer, M. (1983) Spheres of Justice. New York: Basic Books. 
Walzer, M. (1987) Interpretation and Social Criticism. Cambridge MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
Walzer, M (1988, 2nd Ed 2002) The Company of Critics. New York: Basic Books. 
Walzer, M. (1992) What it means to be an American. New York: Marsilio. 
Walzer, M. (1995a) Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad. Notre Dame: 
Notre Dame Press. 
Walzer, M. (1995b) ‘The Politics of Rescue’ Dissent (Winter) pp 35 – 41. 
Walzer, M. (2003) ‘The United States in the World – Just Wars and Just Societies: An 
Interview with Michael Walzer’ Imprints: A Journal of Analytical Socialism 7 (1), 4 – 
19. 
Walzer, M. (2004) Arguing about War. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Walzer, M. (2005) Politics and Passion: Towards a More Egalitarian Liberalism. New 
Haven: Yale University Press. 
Walzer, M. (2007) Thinking Politically: Essays in Political Theory, New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
Walzer, M (2011) ‘The Case Against our Attack on Libya’ The New Republic 20 March 2011 
http://www.tnr.com/article/world/85509/the-case-against-our-attack-libya  
Walzer, M (2012) ‘Syria’ Dissent March 9 https://www.dissentmagazine.org/blog/syria  
Walzer, M (2013a) ‘Syria: What ought to be done?’ Dissent May 14.	
https://www.dissentmagazine.org/blog/syria-what-ought-to-be-done  
Walzer, M. (2013b) ‘Were we wrong about Syria? Dissent October, 30.	
https://www.dissentmagazine.org/blog/were-we-wrong-about-syria  
Walzer, M. (2015a) The Paradox of Liberation: Secular Revolutions and Religious 
Counterrevolutions New Haven: Yale University Press.  
Walzer, Michael (2015) ‘What Kind of War is This’ Dissent December 3. 
https://www.dissentmagazine.org/blog/france-us-uk-air-strikes-isis-just-war-theory  
Walzer, M. and Miller, D. (1995) Pluralism, Justice and Equality, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.  
Walzer, M., Lorberbaum, M., Zohar, N. and Ackerman, A. (Eds.) (2000) The Jewish Political 
Tradition: Volume 1, Authority, New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Walzer, M. Lorberbaum, M., Zohar, N. and Ackerman, A. (Eds.) (2003) The Jewish Political 
Tradition. Volume 2. Membership, New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Wasserstrom, R. (1978) Review of Just and Unjust Wars in Harvard Law Review 92 (2) pp. 
536 – 545. 
 
